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This paper explores foreign equity caps for international joint ventures under different types
of competition, i.e., Bertrand and Cournot competition, with product differentiation. We
demonstrate that government sets the foreign equity cap at a laxer level under Cournot
competition than under Bertrand competition. This result illustrates that the possibility of
international joint ventures weakens government's ability to affect firm behavior through the
implementation of foreign equity caps.
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The foreign equity cap (FEC) is a policy which imposes a ceiling on foreign
ownership shares in international joint ventures (IJV), and historically has
been implemented in many developing countries. For example, Thailand
limits foreign ownership share to less than 50% for IJVs in 43 industries
(JETRO, 2002).
Most of the articles on FECs (e.g. Katrak, 1983; Das and Katayama,
2003) consider perfectly competitive markets. However, IJVs are often ob-
served in imperfectly competitive industries such as the automobile indus-
try. Tomoda and Kurata (2004) analyze FECs under imperfect competition.
They focus on FEC under homogeneous Cournot (i.e. quantity-setting) com-
petition. However, in reality, there is product diﬀerentiation in many imper-
fect competitive industries, and competition between ﬁrms is not necessarily
quantity-setting. How is policy aﬀected if competition is of a price-setting
nature?
The purpose of this note is to examine the optimal level for the FEC under
Bertrand (i.e. price-setting) and Cournot (i.e. quantity-setting) competition
with product diﬀerentiation. We set up a simple partial equilibrium model
based on Tomoda and Kurata (2004), where ﬁrms negotiate their ownership
shares to form an IJV under the FEC. If negotiations do not succeed, they
compete according to either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We explore
the optimal (i.e. welfare-maximizing) the FEC level endogenously for both
types of competition and demonstrate that government chooses a laxer opti-
mal FEC level under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.
Our analysis here is related to studies on government’s incentive to imple-
ment policy (e.g. Cheng, 1988; Clarke and Collie, 2006a,b).1 These studies
do not include the possibility that ﬁrms may form an IJV. In this note, on the
other hand, we allow ﬁrms to form an IJV. In reality, trends toward global-
ization have made it much easier for ﬁrms to own foreign plants or form IJVs.
In this sense, clariﬁcation of the diﬀerence in government’s policy incentives
given the possibility that ﬁrms may form IJVs seems worthwhile.
1Cheng (1988) focuses on import tariﬀs and production subsidies, and Clarke and Collie
(2006a,b) investigate welfare-maximizing import tariﬀs and export taxes, and maximum-
revenue import tariﬀs and export taxes. In this note, we deal with a diﬀerent type of
policy. Whereas the above policies aﬀect competition between ﬁrms, a FEC aﬀects the
ownership shares of an IJV instead of competition. Thus, our result holds under more
general settings; i.e., oligopoly with more than three ﬁrms.
12 The Model
There are two countries, home and foreign, and two industries, Y and Z.
In the Z industry, goods are produced with constant returns to scale, freely
traded, and sold in a perfectly competitive market. We aggregate them into
one good and regard this as a numeraire.
In contrast, the Y industry has diﬀerentiated oligopolistic markets. Each
country has one ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1 (home ﬁrm) and ﬁrm 2 (foreign ﬁrm), that
produces diﬀerentiated goods. In order to distinguish between products, we
denote good i to describe the product of ﬁrm i (i = 1,2). We assume that
ﬁrms only sell their products in the home country – the foreign market is
negligible.
The preferences of a representative consumer in the home country are











i − γy1y2 + z, (1)
where αi > 0 (i = 1,2), γ ∈ (0,1), and yi and z are the respective demands
for products produced in the Y industry (i = 1,2) and those produced in the
Z industry. The parameter γ ∈ (0,1) describes the degree of substitution
between y1 and y2; as γ goes to zero (resp. one) the products tend to be
independent (resp. perfect substitutes).
We assume that ﬁrm 1 locates in the home country, while ﬁrm 2 can
change its production location. When ﬁrm 2 decides to locate in the home
country, it is legally obliged to form an IJV with the local ﬁrm. The gov-
ernment implements a FEC, θ ∈ [0,1] that imposes a ceiling on the share of
equity the foreign ﬁrm can possess.
If ﬁrm 2 locates in the home country, an IJV is formed by ﬁrms 1 and
2 and both y1 and y2 are supplied by a monopolist. On the other hand, if
ﬁrm 2 chooses to locate in the foreign country, ﬁrms noncooperatively supply
their products in the market. Thus, in this case, a diﬀerentiated duopoly is
realized. We distinguish these two cases by calling the former IJV-monopoly
and the latter Diﬀerentiated-duopoly.
In the IJV-monopoly, ﬁrms negotiate their equity shares of the IJV by
Nash bargaining under a given level of FEC. We denote β (resp. (1 − β)) as
foreign equity share (resp. domestic equity share), i.e., the equity share of
ﬁrm 2 (resp. ﬁrm 1). Equity shares correspond to each ﬁrm’s proﬁt share for
the IJV. In this case, both ﬁrms cooperate to reduce the IJV’s production
costs. Let ci be the constant marginal cost of producing good i (i = 1,2).
We assume that ﬁrm 2 has a lower marginal cost, because of diﬀerences in
2technology; i.e., c2 < c1. If the IJV is formed, the marginal cost of producing
y1 is reduced from c1 to ˆ c1 (ˆ c1 < c1) through the application of ﬁrm 2’s
technology.2 For simplicity, when forming the IJV, ﬁrms are assumed to pay
any coordination costs.
In diﬀerentiated-duopoly, on the other hand, ﬁrm i faces a marginal cost
ci (i = 1,2). When ﬁrm 2 exports products from the foreign country, it
incurs a transport cost, t, per unit of output.
We consider a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the home country
determines a level of FEC. In the second stage, ﬁrms bargain on equity shares.
Depending on the outcome of this bargaining either a IJV-monopoly or a
diﬀerentiated-duopoly is realized. In the third stage, given market structure,
ﬁrms produce and sell the products. In this stage, Bertrand (price-setting)
and Cournot (quantity-setting) competition are considered.3
Hereafter, we use superscripts J, B and C to express IJV-monopoly,
Diﬀerentiated-Bertrand duopoly, and Diﬀerentiated-Cournot duopoly, respec-






















2 − c2 − t)y
l
2, l = B,C. (3)
3 Analysis
In this section we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. In
the following analysis, we assume parameter values that lead to an interior
solution where both ﬁrms have positive sales in equilibrium.
We focus on the third stage. The utility function (1) yields the following
inverse demand and direct demand functions:




(αi − γαj − pi + γpj), (5)
where G ≡ 1 − γ2. Based on equations (4) and (5), we can calculate equi-
librium prices, outputs, and proﬁts under IJV-monopoly, and Diﬀerentiated-
2Since this cost reduction occurs through the application of ﬁrm 2’s technology, the
marginal cost of producing good 2 for the IJV is still c2.
3Singh and Xives (1984) consider the situation where ﬁrms oﬀer either price or quantity
commitments. They includes the case where one ﬁrm sets price and the other ﬁrm sets
quantity. In this paper, we rule out this possibility.
3Bertrand and Cournot duopoly in the third stage. These values are summa-
rized in Table 1.
From Table 1, we ﬁnd that all equilibrium outputs, prices and proﬁts
are functions of (αi − ci) (i = 1,2). This implies that many of results in
the analysis of monopoly and oligopoly depend on values of (αi − ci) (e.g.
Clarke and Collie, 2006b). It is noteworthy that αi is the choke price; i.e.,
the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for ﬁrm i’s product, and ci is
marginal cost of ﬁrm i (i = 1,2). We thus deﬁne Ωi ≡ αi − ci as the cost-
considered choke price.
In IJV-monopoly, the IJV always chooses monopoly outputs and prices,
and earns monopoly proﬁts regardless of whether it sets price or quantity.
As stated above, the IJV has a cost reduction in the production of good 1.
We deﬁne
δ ≡
α1 − ˆ c1
α1 − c1
=
α1 − ˆ c1
Ω1
> 1, (6)
in order to measure the cost reduction in terms of the cost-considered choke
price. The sign of equation (6) is easily obtained by ˆ c1 < c1. The parameter
δ represents the degree of eﬀectiveness of cost reduction: how forming the
IJV raises the cost-considered choke price for good 1.
On the other hand, in diﬀerentiated-duopoly, equilibrium outputs, prices,
and proﬁts are diﬀerent under diﬀerentiated Bertrand and Cournot duopolies.
It is well known that outputs under Bertrand competition are greater than
those under Cournot competition, and thus price under Cournot competition
is higher than that under Bertrand competition (e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984).
Furthermore, since we assume that the diﬀerentiated goods are substitutes,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Singh and Vives, 1984)
If diﬀerentiated goods are substitutes, proﬁts under Cournot competition are
greater than those under Bertrand competition.
We now consider bargaining between ﬁrms 1 and 2 in the second stage.


















where βl is the foreign equity share of the IJV for a type of competition l
(l = B,C). Constraints (8) and (9) require that the proﬁt distributed to
4ﬁrm i in IJV monopoly be greater than ﬁrm i’s proﬁt under diﬀerentiated
duopoly (i = 1,2). If either of these conditions is violated, an IJV is not




ΠJ (for ﬁrm 2) and βl ≡ 1 −
πl
1
ΠJ (for ﬁrm 1) (10)
for l = B,C. That is, if βl is under βl (resp. above βl), ﬁrm 2 (resp. ﬁrm
1) does not agree to set up a IJV. Let ˜ βl be the unconstrained solution of









When both ﬁrms agree to form the IJV, ˜ βl must be in the interval (βl,βl),
which implies that ΠJ > πl
1 + πl
2. Note that, in this stage, the level of the
FEC is given for both ﬁrms. Let θl be the FEC level where bargaining is not
successful for a given type of competition l. Depending on the level of θl, we
have three possibilities for the realized market structure and the equilibrium
foreign ownership share β∗
l .4
Lemma 2
(i)If θl ∈ [˜ βl,1], IJV-monopoly is realized and the equilibrium foreign owner-
ship share is β∗
l = ˜ βl.
(ii) If θl ∈ [βl, ˜ βl), IJV-monopoly is realized and the equilibrium foreign own-
ership share is β∗
l = θl.
(iii) If θl ∈ [0,βl), Diﬀerentiated-duopoly is realized and the equilibrium for-
eign ownership share is not determined.
In the ﬁrst stage, the home country determines the level of the FEC to
maximize domestic welfare. The home country’s welfare is organized as
Wl =
(
W J = CSJ + (1 − βl)ΠJ,
W l = CSl + πl
1, l = B,C,
(12)




m is the consumer surplus in the home country, and y∗
m is
the equilibrium output vector under the market structure m (m = J,B,C).
Note that the consumer surplus is independent of the foreign ownership share
4Proofs of upcoming Lemma and Propositions appear in the Appendix.
5βl for all market structures. From Lemma 2, market structures depend on





W l = CSl + πl
1 for θl ∈ [0,βl)
W J = CSJ + (1 − θl)ΠJ for θl ∈ [βl, ˜ βl]
W J = CSJ + (1 − ˜ βl)ΠJ for θl ∈ [˜ βl,1]
(13)
under l = B,C. We then have two possible solutions for the equilibrium
foreign equity cap level θ∗
l .
Proposition 1
If W J(βl) > W l, the home country chooses θ∗
l = βl, and IJV-monopoly
is realized. If W J(βl) < W l, the home country chooses θ∗
l ∈ [0,βl) and
diﬀerentiated-duopoly occurs (l = B,C).
Which equilibrium is realized depends on combinations of parameters. In
particular, as the degree of eﬀectiveness of cost reduction δ is larger (resp.
smaller), the possibility of IJV-monopoly (resp. Diﬀerentiated-duopoly) is
higher.5
In the following, we focus on the case where δ is suﬃciently large such
that the IJV is formed in equilibrium. From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we
have the following result.
Proposition 2
Suppose the IJV is formed under both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Then, the optimal FEC level under Cournot competition is higher than that
under Bertrand competition.
Note that a higher (resp. lower) FEC level corresponds to a laxer (resp.
stricter) policy for the foreign ﬁrm. Proposition 2 thus shows that the FEC
under Diﬀerentiated-Cournot duopoly is laxer than that in Diﬀerentiated-
Bertrand duopoly. Our result here can be considered as a characteristic of
the FEC. We allow foreign ﬁrm to choose its location for production. The
foreign ﬁrm decides its location in the second stage and, as shown in equa-
tion (9), locates in home country if its receipt of IJV proﬁt is greater than
its duopoly proﬁt. Foreign ﬁrm does not locate in the home country if the
5At δ = 1 (i.e., no cost reduction), Wl > WJ for any l = B,C, while if δ is suﬃciently
large, the sign will be opposite. For example, suppose that γ = 0.5, Ω1 = 5, Ω2 = 10,
t = 0.1. Under Bertrand competition, WJ = 16.6615 < WB = 19.7351 at σ = 1, while
WJ = 19.7865 > WB at σ = 1.5. Under Cournot competition, WJ = 16.2172 < WC =
16.468 at σ = 1, while WJ = 19.3422 > WC at σ = 1.5. Note that Wl is independent of
σ (l = B,C).
6home country government enforces a strict FEC. Then, the home country’s
government loses a part of welfare, i.e., part of the IJV’s proﬁt. Thus, the
FEC can be regarded as compensation of proﬁts to attract the foreign ﬁrm.
Although the home country’s government has the ability to aﬀect ﬁrm be-
havior, because it chooses the level of the FEC in the ﬁrst stage, the ability
is not strong in the existence of the compensation of proﬁt. From Lemma 1,
proﬁt under Cournot duopoly is larger than that under Bertrand duopoly.
The home country’s government thus needs to provide more compensation
for the foreign ﬁrm under Cournot competition than under Bertrand com-
petition. Therefore, the FEC under Cournot competition is laxer than that
under Bertrand competition.
4 Conclusions
We have investigated the optimal level of a FEC under Bertrand and Cournot
competition. We demonstrated that the optimal level of a FEC under Cournot
competition is higher than that under Bertrand competition. This result
implies that the host country government implements a laxer policy under
Cournot competition. This shows a characteristic of FECs: the compensa-
tion of IJV’s proﬁt to attract foreign ﬁrms. The possibility of forming an
IJV weakens government’s ability to aﬀect ﬁrms’ activities.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 2: If θl > ˜ βl, the unconstrained foreign ownership
share satisﬁes FEC; i.e., FEC is not binding, and thus the equilibrium own-
ership share is β∗ = ˜ βl. If θl ∈ [βl, ˜ βl), then FEC is binding, and the equilib-
rium ownership share is β∗
l = θl. Finally, if θl < βl, ﬁrm 2 does not agree to
form the IJV, and ownership share does not need to be determined. 
B. Proof of Proposition 1: Note that the home country’s welfare is not
continuous at βl = βl and that it is decreasing in θl only for θl ∈ [βl, ˜ βl]. If
W l 6 W J(βl), the government maximize domestic welfare by setting θ∗
l = βl
and the IJV monopoly is realized (see Figure 1). On the other hand, if
W l > W J(βl), the government chooses θ∗
l ∈ [0,βl) and eliminates the possi-
bility of the IJV monopoly (see Figure 2). 
C. Proof of Proposition 2: From Proposition 1, θ∗
B = βB = πB
2 /ΠJ and
θ∗
C = βC = πC
2 /ΠJ. Since we have πB
2 < πC
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Proﬁt: ΠJ = 1
4G {(δΩ1)2 + Ω2
2 − 2γδΩ1Ω2}
(ii) Diﬀerentiated Bertrand duopoly
Outputs: yB
1 = 1
GH {(2 − γ2)Ω1 − γ(Ω2 − t)}
yB
2 = 1
GH {(2 − γ2)(Ω2 − t) − γΩ1}
Prices: pB
1 = 1
H {(2 − γ2)Ω1 − γ(Ω2 − t)} + c1
pB
2 = 1
H {(2 − γ2)(Ω2 − t) − γΩ1} + c2 + t
Proﬁts: πB
1 = 1




GH2 {(2 − γ2)(Ω2 − t) − γΩ1}
2
(iii) Diﬀerentiated Cournot duopoly
Outputs: yC
1 = 1
H {2Ω1 − γ(Ω2 − t)}
yC
2 = 1
H {2(Ω2 − t) − γΩ1}
Prices: pC
1 = 1
H {2Ω1 − γ(Ω2 − t)} + c1
pC
2 = 1
H {2(Ω2 − t) − γΩ1} + c2 + t
Proﬁts: πC
1 = 1




H2 {2(Ω2 − t) − γΩ1}
2
Note: Ω1 ≡ α1 − c1, Ω2 ≡ α2 − c2, G ≡ 1 − γ2, H ≡ 4 − γ2, and
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Figure 2: The case of θ∗
l ∈ [0,βl)
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